A Strategy fork · On Ethereum

The floor only rises.

A reflexive on-chain treasury mechanism, ported from MicroStrategy's BTC-per-share strategy into a Uniswap V4 hook.

Strategoi · June 2026 · strat.meme

Abstract

A purely on-chain treasury mechanism would allow Bitcoin-style accumulation dynamics to be encoded directly into an automated market maker, without an issuing corporation. A constant 2% fee on every buy and sell is routed by a Uniswap V4 hook into a contract-controlled reserve. The reserve never disburses dividends, never repays debt, and cannot be voted to dilute. Each transaction therefore raises the reserve per token monotonically. When the market price falls below the on-chain reserve floor, the same hook reverses direction: the treasury market-buys the token and burns it, raising reserve-per-token further. The mechanism is reflexive in only one direction — upward. We propose this as a memetic abstraction of MicroStrategy's BTC-per-share strategy, with the corporate intermediary removed.

Introduction

Commerce on financial markets has come to rely almost exclusively on corporate intermediaries serving as trusted accumulators of scarce assets. Strategy Inc., formerly MicroStrategy, demonstrated that a public company could be operated as a Bitcoin accumulation vehicle, growing the number of Bitcoin held per share for forty-eight consecutive quarters. The model requires the company's equity to trade at a premium to the net asset value of its Bitcoin treasury — its mNAV multiple[1]. While the premium holds, issued equity is accretive: each new share sold above NAV adds more Bitcoin per share than it dilutes.

The model fails when mNAV falls below 1.0. New equity issuance becomes dilutive, the company cannot fund preferred-stock dividends from issuance alone, and the treasury must be sold to service obligations. In late May 2026, Strategy disclosed its first Bitcoin sale since 2022[2]. The reflexivity broke.

What is needed is a mechanism that captures the upward part of the reflexive loop and structurally cannot enter the downward part. There can be no preferred holders to pay, no debt to roll, no corporate overhead to fund. There is only the reserve, the token, and the hook.

The Mechanism

Let R denote the on-chain reserve balance, denominated in the pool's quote asset (here, wrapped ether). Let S denote the total token supply. The reserve-per-token, hereafter the floor, is defined as

N = R / S(1)

Let P denote the instantaneous market price of the token in the quote asset, taken as the geometric-mean price of the Uniswap V4 pool over a thirty-second lookback window. The market-to-NAV multiple, by direct analogy to mNAV, is

m = P / N(2)

The V4 hook intercepts every swap. On each interaction it computes m and routes the transaction fee — fixed at 2% of the input amount — according to two cases.

Case 1: m ≥ 1 (Accumulation)

The fee is denominated in the quote asset and forwarded to the reserve contract without conversion. Because the buyer paid at or above the floor, this transfer is by definition accretive. The supply S is unchanged. The reserve R grows. The floor N increases.

Case 2: m < 1 (Defence)

The fee is held by the hook for the duration of the block. At block close, the hook withdraws an equivalent quantity of quote asset from the reserve and executes a market-buy of the token, the proceeds of which are sent to the burn address. Both R and S fall, but the rate of supply contraction strictly dominates the rate of reserve depletion under any non-zero spread. The floor N rises. The multiple m tends back toward unity from below.

swapper (buy or sell) 2% V4 hook if m ≥ 1: route to R if m < 1: buy & burn FIG.01 reserve R wETH only 0xdead burned $STRAT
Figure 1. Routing of the 2% hook fee in the two cases. In both, the reserve-per-token N rises.

The Ratchet

The mechanism we describe satisfies the following invariant: at every swap that touches the pool, NtNt-1. The reserve-per-token is a monotone-increasing function of time. This is the property of a mechanical ratchet, which permits motion in one direction and prohibits it in the reverse direction. We accordingly say that the reserve-per-token is ratcheted upward.

No external authority — no multisig, no governance vote, no owner key — can release the reserve. The reserve contract is permanently bound to a single outflow: market purchases of $STRAT for burn, executed only when m < 1.

Tokenomics

Supply

1,000,000,000 STRAT

Tax (buy / sell)

2 / 2 percent

Mint authority

Renounced

Quote asset

wETH uniswap v4

Initial reserve

0 grows from fees

Team allocation

0 none, ever

Implementation

The token contract is a standard ERC-20 with a fixed initial mint of one billion tokens. Mint authority is renounced. The reserve contract is a minimal vault that accepts wrapped-ether deposits from a designated hook address. The hook is the only permitted caller of the reserve's buyAndBurn() function. The pool key is a canonical Uniswap V4 pool with STRAT/wETH, an empty pool manager fee, and the hook address bound to the beforeSwap and afterSwap flags.

To prevent flash-loan manipulation of the price input P, the hook reads from a TWAP oracle over a thirty-second lookback. To prevent dilution attacks, liquidity additions below the current floor are reverted.

Conclusion

We have proposed a treasury mechanism that captures the accumulating half of the reflexive loop and structurally excludes its dilutive half. There are no preferred holders, no debt instruments, no corporate overhead, no quarterly obligations. There is only the reserve, the supply, and the hook between them.

The floor only rises.

References

  1. VanEck Research. "Deconstructing Strategy (MSTR): Premium, Leverage, and Capital Structure." (2025).
  2. Coindesk. "Strategy sold 32 BTC for $2.5M in late May, filing shows." (June 2026).
  3. Nakamoto, S. "Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System." (2008).
  4. Adams, H. et al. "Uniswap v4 Core." (2024).